Archive for the ‘Critical Theory’ Category

The Problem With Paragons

Thursday, August 23rd, 2007

The world is only binary because that’s the structure our logic and our language enforces on a diverse and often chaotic reality. Human beings are able to process increasingly complex logical problems in the span of seconds that would require several months of computer programming to even set the decision tree possibilities if using a digital computer precisely because of this ability to simplify complex data sets into a less precise and less accurate summary. Unfortunately, imposing such a structure becomes such second nature that we often simplify areas that resist simplification. This leads to the problem of stereotypes.

The simplification of a complex whole is a form of linguistic and logical violence. Simplification requires building a definition (usually a dichotomy) that captures the information that fits within the top of the statistical bell curve. Such a definition requires cutting away the fringes by using phrases like “for the most part” or “generally”. In essence, in our urge to provide simple and easily handled definitions, we are building a class definition around an often non-existent ideal or paragon. The problem, however, doesn’t come in when we’re dealing with a very abstract or academic discussion of language. Rather, true difficulties only arise when we begin to take those simplified definitions out into the often chaotic data distribution of real life. Our structure now becomes an ideological prison that keeps us in classification rather than observation mode. Rather than adapting our definition based on new data as a true scientist must, we become excluding or shaming of all who don’t fit our reference. A feminist like me sees this problem most readily in issues surrounding gender. Likewise my muslim friend is very likely to see the problem in light of our Western religious structures. A homosexual often sees the problem as it involves sexual orientation. All of these are great examples that can illustrate the fundamental problem of turning a complex whole into an easily (mis)handled object.

When we define in increasing detail what it means to be a woman or a man, we describe an ideal with criteria that will eventually exclude nearly every actual member of that class. No one will ever completely fit the stereotype, and this leads to an internal shame. The problem in reality isn’t being a hairy woman or a guy who likes musicals. The problem is that the class definition excludes you from truly belonging to that group. In object-oriented terms, you are not a flawed instantiation of a perfect class. The “bug” is in the class description itself. Each of us is queer when compared with an unrealistic ideal.

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Ettiquette Is A Tool of the Patriarchy

Wednesday, September 27th, 2006

One of my biggest pet peeves involving marriage and married people is the tendency for people to address a couple as “Mr. and Mrs. Husband’s Name”. The very language structure subsumes the feminine and, in that omission, makes it clear that the woman is a lesser being, a mere unmentionable moon orbiting blissfully around planet male. This annoyed me so much that at our wedding I insisted that my father (who performed the wedding) refer to us at the end of the ceremony with the phrase, as either “Allyson and Rusty Haskell” or “Rusty and Allyson Haskell”. I honestly can’t remember which version was used.

I haven’t met this “Mrs. Rusty Haskell” person, but she sure gets a lot of mail at my apartment.

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The Writer and the Critic

Wednesday, August 9th, 2006

The writer is a critic. Every piece of writing is an interpretation. There is no objective reality, and clinging to that comfortable concept is nothing more than an attempt to lock the truth out in a pretense of normalcy. Truth is wordless and eternal, but I refuse to fall into the trap that held me captive for years after I discovered Levinas. Yes, the simplification of a complex Other into an easily digestible simple construct isn’t a great example of ethics as first philosophy, but we also must guard against a philosophy that so venerates the Other that the face-to-face relationship becomes just another form of priesthood. This turns the I/Other back into the I/Thou.

The Levinasian concept of the caress carries the implication of seasoned lovers who know in fleeting moments the faltering, fumbling magic of discovery. Writing—and life in general—is the joy of two virgin lovers alone in the dark discovering in each moment the fulfillment of pleasure. We make wrong moves and wrong assumptions, but recognizing wrong view is another form of right view. Truth is an experiential exercise. Mistakes are what make the process beautiful, personally meaningful, and fun. Stated more directly, the mistakes are a fundamental part of the process because they personalize truth into experience.

Write. Learn. Love. Experience. Life is not a spectator sport. Allowing the paralyzing grip of postmodernism, the sallow face of learned helplessness, or any other irrelevant impediment rob you and all of us of the benefit of your experience is a tragedy that even Shakespeare would envy.

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The Role of the Other in Art

Wednesday, May 17th, 2006

While working through chapter 3 of The Artist’s Way by Julia Cameron, I came across this gem:

Art requires a safe hatchery…As artists, we must learn to create our own safe environments. We must learn to protect our artist child from shame. We do this by defusing our childhood shamings, getting them on the page, and sharing them with a trusted, nonshaming other.

I feel like capitalizing the “other” in the above quote because the concepts of Levinas echo throughout. The Other in this passage calls our artistic self into being—or rather interbeing. The artistic self is not a selfish or lonely creation. The artistic self is an interdependent construct of an I/Other relationship, a face-to-face meeting between two unknowable and ineffable selves who can only by themselves see through a glass darkly.

The perspective of an artist is an interdependent perspective that sheds light on universal truths. Such a perspective is impossible and too infinite for one person alone. Where two or three are gathered together, artistic vision is there in the midst.

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Interdependence As Non-Violence

Monday, February 6th, 2006

Interdependence is the only escape from violence. Any time we simplify a complex object, by necessity we are fitting something something into concepts that we have already set up within our logical mind. Parts that don’t fit with our pre-existing internal concept are either ignored or purposefully thrown away. To put this is somewhat Levinasian terms, we are grasping rather than caressing. We’re not seeking to discover with a beginner’s mind; we are reaching out to mold our perceptions into something understandable. This simplification is a form of violence.

In The Heart of the Buddha’s Teaching, Thich Nhat Hanh cuts to the heart of the matter with one poignant sentence: “A real being is different from a concept.” To truly understand this, you must understand that concepts are mental constructs. Too often, when we’re getting to know someone, the process basically boils down to a system of linking you to my pre-existing concepts. Thinking about me, you might make the following links within your mind:

  • geek
  • Christian
  • Buddhist
  • vegan
  • wears glasses
  • likes animals

The fact is that no matter how many tags you add or mental flags you set, I cannot be summed up completely by a system of variables. The true nature of reality is not nearly so rigid. Furthermore, in absolute reality, you have to even ask yourself what you mean by me. Are you so sure that you and I are autonomous beings? Can either one of us even exist without an Other to will us into being?

Applied to the religious sphere, it’s helpful to remember that we must also not simplify the truth behind our religious teachings. To avoid doing violence to (or crucifying anew) Christ, I must let go of my concept of Christ. To understand the Buddha, I must stop trying to understand the Buddha.

All reduction and simplification of a complex interdependent whole is a form of violence. Language is a form of violence. The relative realm is a form of violence. To practice non-violence, I must live in the realm of the absolute, of complete interdependence. To lead a life of non-violence, I must give up even my concept of self in favor of the wordless and dynamic truth behind the very concept of concepts.

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The Infinite Nothing

Wednesday, November 23rd, 2005

Assume for a moment that we can describe a model wherein existence is represented by the number 1 and non-existence (something even more complete than our linguistic concept of “nothing”) is represented by the “number” 0.

How do you get from 0 to 1? Infinity. There’s an infinite step between nothing and something. This is a psuedo-mathematical representation of Emmanuel Levinas. For Levinas, we exist in the eyes of the Other, in the face-to-face meeting everyday with the Other. It is this connection to existence that creates and reinforces the infinite responsibility to the Other, or more accurately, it describes how the infinite responsibility to the Other creates and reinforces us. Only that infinite responsibility can change our state from 0 (non-existence) to 1 (existence).

Taking this a step further, any constant compared to infinity is zero. Any number—no matter how large—is just dwarfed right out of existence by an incomprehensible and overwhelming infinity. The infinite responsibility to the Other is so relevant and important that our 1 could easily be 0 and not even matter. Our existence (1) or non-existence (0) is completely irrelevant compared with the infinite.

So where does this leave us? What are we? We are nothing. We are just circles. Each of us is just an endless cycle of 1 and 0, existence and non-existence. We’re both I and the Other. We’re neither I nor the Other. We’re both 0 and 1 at the same time. The Zen concept of the no-self is writ large here, and this is exactly the sort of contradiction that would have bothered my metaphysical thinking before.

Such linguistic and systematic failures are only possible because our language completely breaks down when the time comes for expressing truths of the Universe. Our language, by its very nature, is finite. Capturing the infinite in a finite represenation is a quest doomed to abject failure. Often what our logic and linguistic structure doesn’t allow for is precisely the point that we need to make to express an important truth. This is why the first chapter of John’s gospel is so incomprehensible to most people. It is an absolute beautiful attempt to capture the infinite within the language of the finite. For exactly the same reason, most people have trouble reading some of the Zen koans because the paradox inherent within just causes our logic to throw up its hands in frustration.

The concept of the no-self is an important one for any student of Zen, and this model of 0, 1, and infinity reveals a certain truth that explains for me the no-self in a way that I can hopefully share with others. “I” is nothing but an illusion. I am nothing more than one point in an infinite network or array of Others—the alterity network, if you will. From outside the self perspective, I can see the alterity network for what it truly is. As Arthur Rimbaud said, “Je est un autre.” I is an other.

Adding to the model (or perhaps parallel to it), if we are all just points in the alterity network, then we must consider what it means to be a point. What is a mathematical point? Really it’s just a part of space that has been cataloged or refenced by a coordinate system, but as for the point itself, it’s nothing. A point has no mass, no volume, no sides. A point is a catalogue of nothing. The coordinate system is nothing more than a null pointer. What’s the point? Nothing.

This is the no-self. We are a catalog of nothing. The self is an illusion—a necessary illusion to be sure—but an illusion nonetheless. This is not a defeatist notion! The no-self provides one important path toward liberation. The pain and suffering you experience can’t be “your” pain and suffering if you’re not you. If you are the play of the infinite responsibility between Others, then you’re not constant. That point in space where “you” were cataloged might be precisely where “I” am cataloged right now. We are interdependent. You and I are not one, but we’re also not two. I have an infinite responsibility to you. You have infinite responsibility to me. We are interdependent and connected. Let that suffering go. It’s not relevant to you anymore precisely because of the realization that you’re not you. You’re not the self. You’re the no-self. We are the no-self.

Changing Narratives in a Changing Culture

Thursday, May 22nd, 2003

The subtitle of this paper was “why don’t you work rem, watergate, and orange triangles into it, man?”, a comment uttered by the professor when I presented my prospectus for my final paper. Is the media in which a text is delivered a part of the text itself? Will reading the same words in a different media alter your concept of the text as a whole? More importantly, how does our changing media affect the forms of our actual narratives? The paper is very light on theory, but I think that it makes a few valid points in addition to being a pretty fun read even if critical theory normally puts you sleep.


I’m writing this paper while sitting on the third floor of a thoroughly modern housing facility. To begin typing this paper, I opened Microsoft Word 97 into the 32 megabytes of RAM on my custom-built Pentium 166MMX computer. This computer is connected to a network of other computers here at the University of Florida affectionately known as DHNet (some sort of abbreviation for Department of Housing Network). The server for this network is itself connected to a vast system of computers known to the world as the Internet. While I work on this paper, the e-mail program on my computer (yet another Microsoft application) scans my e-mail server for new e-mail automatically every minute. The temperature in my room is regulated by a central air-conditioning system to ensure my optimum comfort. My cordless telephone is sitting here at my computer table within my reach in case someone decides to call me. My roommate is sitting at his computer right next to me, looking for add-ons to a video game we enjoy playing. We are also listening to “Roxanne” by the Police through the speakers on his computer. When that song is over, the computer will randomly select another song from his hard drive for our listening pleasure.

From the opening paragraph of this paper, you may have made some false assumptions about the purpose of this critical essay, but—hey, man—that’s to be expected. It’s all episodic and uncertain, man. You know what I’m saying? This paper isn’t out to praise the joys of modern society. I’m not going to write about how much better we Americans live now than we did just fifty years ago. I’m also not going to rail against the evil of our techno-consumer society. This will not be another “Microsoft-will-bring-about-the-end-of-the-world” essay. I only want to say that American/European society is much different now than it was only a few short decades ago and that that change is reflected in our narratives.

Why, just last Monday, Bill Gates, Microsoft’s version of John the Baptist, said in a demonstration of Windows 98 that computers were “a tool that magnifies our creativity and allows us to communicate with each other in a new way.”(1) Technology affects how we say what we say and to whom we say it. On a broader level, the rapid paradigm shifts of this technological revolution have altered the way we think and therefore also the way we write.

If I had to put my finger on one of major paradigm shifts that started this great technology/narrative revolution, I would probably point at the end of Newtonian Physics. It might be a bit simplistic to put it that way. Newtonian physics didn’t just disappear overnight; it was a gradual process. We can’t really assume that all traces of Newtonian thought have been wiped from our thoughts either. We lived with Newton much longer than we’ve lived with Heisenberg so there are bound to be profound Newtonian influences on our theory and in our daily lives. Those complications notwithstanding, I believe it’s safe to say that the sciences of calculated uncertainty brought about by this paradigm shift have altered our narrative space.

Perhaps we should consider what I’m talking about when I refer to “Newtonian physics” since that is such a broad and non-specific term. Within the theories of Isaac Newton, I see a central guiding principle: If we can know all of the variables in a given equation, we can solve it and predict the future behavior of that system. This was a very productive and persistent system of scientific thought. It was the guiding scientific model for over two hundred years. Within this century, however, that model has shifted to a concept of uncertainty.

Most influential in this reversal was the Heisenberg uncertainty principle of particle physics, which bears the name of its creator, Werner Heisenberg. According to this theory, we cannot determine accurately both the speed and position of a given atomic particle at one specific point in time. The more accurately we judge the one attribute, the less accurately we can judge the other. In other words, if we really wanted to determine precisely how fast an electron was moving, we would have no idea where it actually was. Likewise, if we wanted to determine exactly where that electron was, we would have no idea how fast it was moving. With the acceptance of this model, structured models of the atom were disregarded. Modern particle physics is a set of probabilities; models predict where an electron might be rather than where it is. Definitely was replaced by probably.

This gave way to all manner of uncertainty in the sciences. The age-old quest to predict the weather was acknowledged as impossible for any period of time greater than a few days. The attempts to explain science as a huge, structured model ended in something called Chaos Theory, which states that small-scale events—a butterfly in Tokyo flapping its wings, for example—eventually affect the large-scale events—perhaps a thunderstorm in Tehran. In this logic, there are simply too many variables in every equation to solve for.

Once again, I would like to make it clear that this is a gross simplification. I am speaking here of trends. On the whole, science has become more uncertain, but there are still Newtonian ideas at play in all branches of science. It is the overall trend, I believe, that has influenced our thoughts on writing. This air of uncertainty has infected our narratives. We have begun to doubt concepts within our writing that were once considered something just sort of sacred.

Take our concept of plot as an example. In general, we expect our plots to progress linearly. We want to begin with a beginning and end with an end. This concept is being challenged, though. In Queen of the Damned, Anne Rice follows a different character in each section. Instead of progressing in a straight temporal line, the plot resets for each character. We determine what one character was doing, and then we find out what the next character was doing during the same time period. It isn’t until near the end of the novel that all of the threads come together.

You could also think about the changes in our fundamental theories of drama—most notably the “fourth wall” that forbade audience interaction with the players onstage. Bertolt Brecht turned those assumptions on their head. He had his players engage the audience directly or put an actor in the audience to spurn interaction. Fundamental ideas in our literary theory were cast into doubt and challenged. Certainty was made uncertain.

However, if I tried to explain the whole of narrative in terms of uncertainty, I would be failing as a critic. This is only an isolated example of how technology and paradigm shifts in scientific theory have altered our narrative forms. Perhaps it would be helpful to examine another example of technology altering narrative to more fully illustrate what I’m writing about.

I think the television would be an interesting case study. Television is, after all, a completely new form that has come about in this century. It borrowed elements from drama but altered them to suit the new medium. We don’t have full plays in several acts on television (at least not every day). Television programs are usually presented in thirty-minute segments. These thirty-minute programs are, by their nature, episodic. Accordingly, we don’t see the character development and fleshing out of the plot line in a television program that we see in the conventional cultural fantasy of drama. This, of course, seems to be a painfully obvious statement. It probably is.

Of course, the episodic nature of television wasn’t completely unheralded. I don’t want to give that impression either. Comic strips existed before the proliferation of televisions. The concept of stories published as serials also existed. The real difference between these forms and television, though, is that television almost always provides a resolution in thirty minutes. Pre-television comic strips and serials were usually part of a larger narrative; they could be combined to produce a single plot structure. This unification is often absent in most television programs—most notably the sitcom(2). This episodicity present in television programming has spilled over into other aspects of our culture—including our writing. The attempt to render episodicity in narrative often leads to a certain disjointed nature(3).

Assia Djebar’s Fantasia: An Algerian Calvacade might be considered an appropriate example of a disjointed and episodic narrative. The book is divided into sections. On one hand, we have a narrative involving a young girl growing up in Algeria (presumably autobiographical material from Djebar herself). On the other hand, we have a historical narrative about the French conquest of Algeria. We alternate between the two almost as if we were channel surfing with a remote control.

“I really want to read about the conquest of Algeria.” Click!

“Wait a minute! There’s also a narrative about Assia Djebar’s struggles as a woman in Algeria that I kind of want to read.” Click!

“On second thought I’d rather read a war story.” Click!

“A personal confessional style narrative would really appeal to me now…” Click!

And so on. This point is actually tied to the whole business of uncertainty as well. Such a narrative is only possible if our traditional concepts of narrative are called into question. Traditionally, we assume that a work belongs in one single genre with only one type of narrative—unless it is an anthology. The uncertainty of our time demands that we question this traditional assumption. Fantasia grows out of that questioning.

If television as a form is generally episodic and—growing out of that—our contemporary narratives tend to speak to that episodicity as a certain disjointedness, what does this say about the desires of our culture as a whole? Television is, after all, very popular in our culture. Advertisers dole out lots of cash to television networks because they know that people are watching the shows. The programs are set up the way they are because people seem to like them that way. The networks are supplying the demand of the culture. Roland Barthes put it this way: “The work is normally the object of consumption…”(4) In other words, these programs are being produced so that people will watch them and the commercials interwoven with them. More viewers yield greater advertising revenue.

This seems to imply that we as a culture desire a more episodic/disjointed narrative. Why? Traditional narratives with linear plot lines and consistent tone seem to be easier to read. Perhaps we prefer the episodic style because we identify so strongly with television as a form. Maybe television has so affected the way we think that the form has permeated our other narrative constructions. Then again, it’s also possible that we don’t actually prefer the episodicity but that’s all we’re getting because that’s what the producers of narrative think we want. Either way, technology both points to and represents our formal desires (either as a type or an anti-type).

Narrative is in a constant state of flux. As new forms and media arise, narrative changes. New works create new forms which are influenced by the new media. Even old narratives take on new meaning as they are transferred to the new media. This is because a work cannot be separated from the way it is presented. I’m actually basing this notion primarily on the work of Jerome J. McGann in “The Text, the Poem, and the Problem of Historical Method.” According to McGann, the term “text” actually refers to a combination of the actual grammatical structures and the physical method by which the text is presented. In simpler terms, a poem published on a WorldWide Web page is different from the same poem published in a hardcover book with a custom book jacket. Once again, we see how technology alters our narratives. It provides new media for the dissemination of literary works, which changes the overall text.

I guess the point of this exercise is that culture influences the works produced in a society. The relationship of technology to narrative is an aspect of that larger premise. This text could only have been produced by me writing in front of this computer with the air-conditioner running, listening to random music on my roommate’s computer in this particular room. This text, like all texts, is dependent both on the conditions of the individual—me—and the state of society as a whole. As conditions change, so does the narrative.

Works Cited

Barthes, Roland. “From Work to Text.” Modern Literary Theory, 3rd edition. Edited by Phillip Rice and Patricia Waugh. New York: Arnold, 1992. 191-197

McGann, Jerome. “The Text, the Poem, and the Problem of Historical Method.” Modern Literary Theory, 3rd edition. Edited by Phillip Rice and Patricia Waugh. New York: Arnold, 1992. 251-256

Footnotes

  1. The speech was delivered at the Windows World convention in Chicago on April 20, 1998. An exact transcript of this speech is available on the Internet. Isn’t technology grand?
  2. Of course, even as I’m writing this, I can think of examples that complicate the idea of television as a purely episodic form. There’s the entire phenomenon of “to be continued.” There are also television serials like Soap Operas, which never seem to reach a resolution. I think that these complications are healthy. It adds to the air of uncertainty which I discussed above.
  3. Consider, for example, the footnote that you are currently reading. It is removed from the text above it. The very nature of a footnote is disjointed. It’s kind of like when Zack Morris stops time and addresses the camera (and therefore the audience as well) in “Saved by the Bell.”
  4. Roland Barthes, “From Work to Text,” Modern Literary Theory, 3rd edition, edited by Phillip Rice and Patricia Waugh, New York, Arnold, 1992, p. 196.

Naming the Other

Thursday, May 15th, 2003

After reading Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon, I’m inclined to wonder—like Shakespeare’s Juliet—”What’s in a name?” Morrison is using the names of both geographical locations and people in a certain way in this novel. Names are deliberately altered and skewed to disorient the reader and make him ponder them in greater detail. Almost everything in Song of Solomon is re-named. But to what purpose?

I think the theories of Emmanuel Levinas—especially those set forth in “Time and the Other”—are extremely useful for sorting out the purpose behind the name switching(1). For Levinas, the self exists in the face-to-face meeting with the Other. This completely goes against the Cartesian edict of “I think therefore I am,” that has so shaped Western culture. The Other in a Levinasian system is indispensable for existence.

What’s interesting in Morrison’s novel, however, is how the various characters relate to the other. Especially during the first part of the novel, when people encounter an Other, they try to understand it. When Freddie discovers Ruth nursing a boy who was too old to nurse, he immediately begins rationalizing. “I mean, ain’t nothing wrong with it. I mean, old folks swear by it. It’s just, you know, you don’t see it up here much.” He isn’t quite at ease, though, until he simplifies the entire (very complex) situation into a joke, calling Macon “Milkman”.

In re-naming Macon, Freddie has simplified a complex other into a familiar object that he can understand. In doing so, he has invalidated the Other, an Other which gives him existence. Levinas also addresses this type of behavior, saying “If one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other. Possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms of power.” Freddie has asserted his own power over Ruth, Macon, and things that he doesn’t understand.

This idea of re-naming as a will to power is perhaps even more evident in the re-naming of Mains Avenue/Not Doctor Street. The Negro(2) communities of the novel are, to a very real extent, held in check by the white communities. However the re-naming of Mains Avenue as Doctor Street was a will to power. “Mains Avenue” had no relevance to the characters’ lives; the fact that the doctor lived on the street did have some relevance, however. The Negroes called street by their own names, thumbing their collective nose at the municipal authorities. However, the authorities didn’t take their actions without trying to strike back. They set up a campaign to “educate” the Negro residents of the community. The street was “not Doctor Street”. The residents re-asserted their power, however, and sarcastically began referring to the road as Not Doctor Street. They were obeying the letter of the municipality’s wishes, but they were also demonstrating power over it through irony.

The spaces and identities that we assign are constantly called into question in the novel, but they are called into question in a way that seeks to make them understood and less foreign. The Other is constantly being forced into the realm of the personal, reifying it to the self. Perhaps this is why the space and authority of the residents is so tenuous. The attempt to gain power at the expense of the Other leads only to an unraveling of the self, whether the self is Macon Dead and his keys or Freddie and his gossip.

Footnotes

  1. Reading this paper several years after I initially wrote it, I’m inclined to say something snide along the line of “Big surprise there, Rusty.” My tendency to use Levinasian theory as a filter for critical analysis looks suspiciously like an example of the adage about every problem looking like a nail when all you have is a hammer. Perhaps I’m being too hard on myself though.
  2. “Negro” is the Spanish word for “black”.

The Role of the Critic in Ozymandias

Wednesday, May 7th, 2003

I originally wrote this short (less than two pages in double-spaced dead tree format) paper about possible answers to questions raised by Percy Bysshe Shelley in “Mutability” for my undergraduate class on Romantic literature. The length of this proto-paper might make it a lot more accessible to those of you who might otherwise skip right over my critical theory articles. Despite its length, I think that it puts forth some interesting answers to Shelley’s own dilemma. If nothing endures, then why create at all? Isn’t it all worthless in the end? Goths beware!


In “Mutability”, Percy Bysshe Shelley sets up an interesting problem for himself. In pondering the ephemeral nature of nature, he concludes that “Nought may endure but Mutability.” That is to say that the only constant is that constants change. There is a certain hopeless futility in this conclusion. If nothing remains but change, then why should Shelley himself continue to write poetry?

Shelley’s answer to this question comes in the form of another poem—”Ozymandias”, a short tale about a “traveler from an antique land” who finds part of a broken statue and a brief inscription in a barren desert. Those are the only relics of the great works of a king named Ozymandias. At first glimpse, the poem seems to focus on the same themes as “Mutability”. The great kingdom of Ozymandias has fallen and been forgotten in the onrush of history. Ozymandias’ kingdom has been left behind in a changing world.

However, closer examination reveals that there is in fact a certain hope to be gained. In a vast desert of nothingness, something does remain—part of a statue of Ozymandias, a pedestal on which the statue stood, and a brief inscription. All that remains of the great kingdom of Ozymandias is the work of artists. We can’t see Ozymandias’ kingdom; we can only see his kingdom interpreted through the eyes of another. The work of the sculptor has lasted. Shelley tells us that the broken visage that remains of the statue tells “that its sculptor well those passions read”. The use of the word “read” seems to imply an important point. The sculptor didn’t create mere an exact representation of Ozymandias but in fact his own interpretation of the man—”the hand that mocked them”. In this way, the artist is simultaneously performing the role of the critic.

There is, however, another perhaps not so obvious character in the poem who is critically reinterpreting—namely the traveller. The traveller views the work of the artist (the sculptor) and assigns new meaning to it. This is because the traveller has a new perspective. The artist, who originally interpreted the works of Ozymandias, was unable to truly foresee that one day the great works of Ozymandias would one day crumble and decay. The traveller, viewing the remnants of the sculptor’s work with the conspicuous absence of the great kingdom mentioned, is able to truly witness how time swallows everything through mutability.

While art in its interpretation of transitory and largely meaningless events assigns meaning to those same events allowing them to transcend the limits imposed by mutability, that art is itself subject to interpretation by another artist. This is the immortality offered by Shelley. The work of art is perpetually reinterpreted in the eyes of another artist. It changes, but it still endures. Thus, in “Ozymandias”, Shelley has presented a way out of the problems introduced in “Mutability” while still preserving the underlying structure. He has set up art as immortality preserved through mutability.

Works Cited

Shelley, Percy Bysshe. “Mutability.” Selected Poems. Mineola, New York: Dover Publication, 1993. 2.

Shelley, Percy Bysshe. “Ozymandias.” Selected Poems. Mineola, New York: Dover Publication, 1993. 5.

Critics and High Places

Thursday, February 27th, 2003

I originally wrote this critical analysis of Michel de Certeau’s “Walking in the City” for my Cultural Studies course in my junior year of college. In this article, I explore the critical ramifications of postmodernism (deconstructionism in particular) through the lens of the theories contained in the work of Derrida’s mentor Emmanuel Levinas. Where does this notion of critical analysis doing violence to a text lead?


A student sits down in front of the computer that the University has forced her to buy with a worn copy of 1984 in hand. She takes a look at the assignment sheet that her British Lit professor handed out the week before. “In a eight- to ten-page essay, provide an analysis of George Orwell’s 1984, paying special attention to the issues of methodology (i.e. How does Orwell balance a polemic against totalitarianism with a creative work of fiction?) and characterization.” She begins to thumb through her copy of 1984, highlighter in hand. Somewhere else entirely Michel de Certeau is going up the elevator in the World Trade Center, heading toward the 110th floor.

At first glimpse (perhaps even on second or third glimpse), the previous paragraph seems to juxtapose two unrelated events. What does a college student preparing an essay on a literary work have to do with Certeau taking a brief excursion up to a high place? I would submit that the two are actually quite similar. You see, both are exercises in totality.

I think it might be handy to first describe why Certeau’s position on floor 110 of the World Trade Center is a space of totalization. When one is so high up above a city, the city itself takes on a new subjectivity. The individual is blurred away into a mass of the large scale. An observer so high above the city is incapable of picking out individual people on the sidewalk and often even individual cars on the streets below.

Here the observer is “out of the city’s grasp”(1) because he feels independent of the myriad of subjectivities contained within the herd of people below. The other is no longer a human face that one sees on the way to the hardware store; on the 110th floor, the entire city becomes an other. Rather than speaking of individual people, the observer speaks of a collective - “the people below” perhaps. The other is no longer a personal concept of the complex individuals that one encounters. Rather, the other is reified into a general idea of all those who are not the self towering above the city. The complex is made simple. Such a vantage point “makes the complexity of the city readable”(2).

Our young critic from the first paragraph is engaging in a strikingly similar project. 1984, like almost any creative work, is complex. It performs on many levels, and that’s what’s keeps us reading it again and again. In writing her assignment, the student is reifying an other. The complex is made simple so that she can show her instructor that she “knows what’s going on”. She is attempting to view the work holistically, to gain a full perspective the text in its entirety. Like Certeau the 110th floor observer, our hypothetical literature student is using totality as a tool of interpretation. De Certeau himself describes his maneuvers on top of the skyscraper as “totalizing the most immoderate of human texts”(3). The city becomes a text, and the observer becomes a critic.

Given this connection between the skyscraper voyeur and the critic, de Certeau’s discussion of the concept city and municipal administration suddenly takes on implications for the practice of literary criticism and critical theory. The problems he exposes with the top-down system of setting up a city apply equally well to “big theory”.

The first problem that de Certeau points out is the issue of whether the totalized text produced by reifying a complex object is actually a real perspective or merely a fictional impossibility. He wonders out loud whether the scene he sees from the window might actually be merely “the analogue of the facsimile produced…by the space planner urbanist, city planner or cartographer”(4). Applying this to our discussion of the intellectual, we must wonder whether the text studied by a critic is the actual text produced by an author or merely a construct set up by the critic himself.

The real danger involved here, a danger which de Certeau himself points out, is that often we don’t realize that the new totalized, reified object that we study for our academic discussions is just a construct. “[T]he functionalist organization…causes the condition of its own possibility - space itself - to be forgotten”(5). Even when we’re merely reading the text—before we ever sit in front of our word processors—we are organizing the space that the author has created. We are never passively taking in what the author has written; we’re constantly trying to understand what the author is doing, what his intent behind the book is. I’m actually reminded of a quote from Levinas’ “Time and the Other”:

If one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other. Possessing, knowing, and grasping are synonyms of power(6).

In the mere attempt to understand a text, we are making a claim to power. We seek to remove the alterity of the other by reifying that text into a series of generalizations about the object as a whole. Make no mistake; this is a transformation on the part of the academic. His object of study is no longer the text itself but a totalized version of it. The other cannot be reified and still remain “other”.

So where can we go from here then? Should the academic merely sit at his desk and copy his text word for word or image for image without the attempt to understand it? Hasn’t de Certeau painted himself into the proverbial corner? This is where I think the business about walking in the city fits in.

De Certeau speaks of a system where “one can analyse the microbe-like, singular and plural practices which an urbanistic system was supposed to administer or suppress…”(7). He is calling for us as intellectuals to step down from the 110th floor and view our text on a closer level without the attempt to fit that text into a “concept” of that text or into the structure of a larger theoretical construct. Forcing a text into such a framework is an exclusion that itself forces “a rejection of everything that is not capable of being dealt with”(8).

The critic who endeavors to “walk in the city” amongst his text must approach it with the understanding that he does not understand. Levinas calls this method the caress and sums it up by saying that it “does not know what it seeks”(9). There cannot be an attempt to analyze a text with a critical method already in the critic’s mind ready to be used. Doing so leads to a system of “discourses that ideologize the city”(10), the totality we are trying to escape from.

De Certeau is very clear on this point. There cannot be the attempt to categorize and quantify the practices of the subjects within the city, telling us that “[s]urveys of routes miss what was: the act itself of passing by”(11). We shouldn’t seek to map out the steps of the city’s people on a big map because in doing so we are totalizing the very act of walking - precisely the act that was supposed to liberate us from our totalization/reification dilemma.

We must remember that the paths are, in the end, arbitrary. Certeau says that the footsteps “are myriad, but do not compose a series”. There cannot be the attempt to find a center and build on that. If we try to locate a center or essence behind the text, we are just re-constructing our World Trade Center perch. The names we give to our spaces are arbitrary and so is any critical attempt to find a center. In this respect, “the rhetoric of walking”(12) might be regarded as a postmodern attempt at criticism. As in Derrida, there can only be play. Any attempt to find a center invariably leads to the construction of an entire theoretical framework of totality that only excludes and reifies our given object of study.

Somewhere else entirely Michel de Certeau is going up the elevator in the World Trade Center, heading toward the 110th floor.

Footnotes

  1. Michel de Certeau, “Walking in the City”, The Cultural Studies Reader (New York, Routledge, 1995), p. 152.
  2. Ibid, p. 153.
  3. Ibid, p. 152.
  4. Ibid, p. 153.
  5. Ibid, p. 156.
  6. Emmanuel Levinas, “Time and the Other”, The Levinas Reader (Oxford, UK, Blackwell, 1996), p. 51.
  7. de Certeau, p. 156.
  8. Ibid, p. 155.
  9. Levinas, p. 51.
  10. Ibid, p. 155.
  11. Ibid, p. 157.
  12. Ibid, p. 158.